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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CALVIN LEE NIXON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appellate Case No. 20071004 
Lower Court No. 070903073 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW Appellant, Calvin Lee Nixon, Jr. (hereafter "Nixon"), by and 
through counsel, Mary C. Corporon, who submits the following as his Reply Brief 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting State's Motion to Dismiss Appellant's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
On or about July 18,2007, the State filed its motion to dismiss the Petitioner's 
Petition for post-conviction relief, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(6) and 
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and supported the same with its 
accompanying memorandum. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in relevant part: 
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(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or facts, to a claim for relief 
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third 
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required, except that the following defenses may, at the option of the 
pleader, be made by motion:... 
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted... 
The State, in its motion to dismiss, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(6), has 
made a procedural motion rather than a substantive motion in the trial court. 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must 
construe the complaint, or in this case the petition, in the light most favorable to the 
Petitioner, and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah 
Power and Light Company, 223 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp, 
898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). Likewise, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will 
be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty that the petitioner or plaintiff would not be 
entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. 
Heiner v. SJ Groves and Son's Company, 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Prowes v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Educator's Mutual Insurance 
Association v. Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 891 P.2d 1029 
(Utah 1995). 
The propriety of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is a question of law, and 
therefore reviewable for correctness. See Stokes v. VanWagoner, 987 P.2d 602 
(Utah 1999). 
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states at: 
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(a) SCOPE. This Rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post 
conviction relief filed under Utah Code Title 78D, Chapter 9, Post-
Conviction Remedies Act. 
Subpart (k) of Rule 65C in addressing the presence of the Petitioner at 
hearings, states: 
The Petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the 
Petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference 
may be conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The 
petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues, but need not otherwise be present in court during 
the proceedings. The court may conduct any hearing at the 
correctional facility where the petitioner is confined. (Emphasis added). 
Clearly, motions made under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are dispositive. The lower court received the State's motion to dismiss 
Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and its accompanying memorandum 
on or about July 18, 2007. Thereafter, on or about September 17, 2007, the 
Petitioner filed his response to the States' motion to dismiss. 
On October 1, 2007, the State filed its reply to Petitioner's response to the 
Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and filed its Notice to 
Submit for Decision. On October 25, 2007, the Court filed its order entitled "Ruling 
Granting State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," which order 
was signed October 24, 2007. On or about May 12, 2008, the State finally 
succeeded in filing its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Dismissing 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," which order was apparently signed May 9,2008. 
However, neither the Court's "Ruling" signed October 24, 2007, nor the Court's 
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"Order" signed on or about May 9,2008, recite that the Petitioner was present before 
the Court for a hearing held on dispositive issues, as is specifically provided by Rule 
65C(k) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Accordingly, the lower court ruled on a procedural motion to dismiss pursuant 
to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(6), "failure to state a claim" and took substantive and 
considered substantive arguments made in writing in ruling on the same. Moreover, 
as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted is 
a dispositive motion the lower court again violated required procedure, disregarding 
the provisions of Rule 65C(k) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure wherein it is 
mandated that the Petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues. 
II. The Trial Court Erred In Finding that the "Interest of Justice" Exception 
to the Statute of Limitations for Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Did 
Not Apply. 
Despite the Appellant's proffer evidence sufficient to meet his burden, the 
lower court improperly dismissed the Appellant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
In so doing, the Court ruled that the Appellant had not met the requirements of the 
"interest of justice" exception to the statute of limitations. 
The parties are in agreement that Adams v. State, 205 Utah 62,123 P.3d 400 
is relevant to the "interest of justice" exception to the Post Conviction Relief Act. In 
Adamswe learn that the "interest of justice" exception should involve an examination 
of both the merits of Petitioner's claim, and the reason for an untimely filing. More 
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importantly, the Utah Supreme Court did not establish as a hard and fast rule what 
a petitioner must demonstrate to establish that his claim has merit, nor what delay 
would justify the late raising of such a claim. 
A. Petitioner has Proffered Sufficient Factual Evidence to Support 
His Claim. 
Petitioner has asserted four separate instances to support his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. First, Petitioner states that he was uninformed 
regarding the availability of a self defense claim. Second, his counsel failed to 
communicate with him. Third, his counsel was "high on drugs" at the time of 
Petitioner's decision to plead at his change of plea hearing, and could not advise 
Petitioner. Fourth, Petitioner's counsel, Geoffrey Clark, was later convicted on two 
third degree felonies and was disbarred by the Utah State Bar. 
The State argues that Petitioner did not establish that his trial counsel, 
Geoffrey Clark, was deficient for any of the reasons Petitioner alleged in his Petition, 
and then, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) to support its 
position, reiterated that the Petitioner failed to establish that his counsel's 
performance was deficient. In so doing, the State neatly compartmentalizes and 
attempts to dispose of the Petitioner's four separate claims of constitutionally 
insufficient counsel. First, the State claims the Petitioner did not demonstrate that 
his counsel was deficient for not discussing the self defense claim. Second, he 
supposedly did not establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to 
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communicate. Third, the Appellant only offered an opinion in his Affidavit that his 
counsel was likely "high on drugs" at the time of his plea and sentencing. Finally, it 
alleges that he failed to demonstrate any resulting error in the trial process regarding 
his trial counsel's subsequent convictions for drug possession and attempted 
distribution of drugs and his disbarment. 
Throughout this, the State fails to recognize that the Petitioner's trial counsel's 
performance must be taken as a whole. All four different elements of counsel's 
behavior, taken together, clearly establishes a constitutionally deficient performance 
to Petitioner's prejudice. At the very least, it establishes sufficient question of such 
that summary dismissal was improper. A counsel who wholly mines a theory of 
defense which might lead to acquittal is a denial of constitutional rights. 
B. The Petitioner's Late Filing was Justified and Excusable. 
The record below is replete with examples of Petitioner's attempts once he 
learned of the deficient performance of his trial counsel, to bring this matter before 
a proper court seeking a post-conviction remedy. He was in custody. He did not 
learn of his trial counsel's misconduct until much later, after his plea. The fact that 
Petitioner filed requests for relief multiple times, and finally a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, all indicated that the Petitioner was diligently moving forward to 
resolve these issues, given the disability of his incarceration. 
As governed by U.C.A. §78-35(a)-107, (now U.C.A. §78B-9-107) an individual 
may file a petition for post-conviction relief within one year after the cause of action 
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has accrued; however, if the Petitioner can show that he was prejudiced and allege 
sufficient facts to support his untimely filing, the Petitioner may be excused from the 
one year time requirement and have a sentence reviewed or a new trial granted. 
As argued in the opening brief, the Appellant was sentenced on September 
2, 2004, to 0 to 5 years term at the Utah State Prison. On June 30, 2005, the 
Appellant's then-counsel, Geoffrey Clark, entered a plea of guilty to two third degree 
felonies, which included the possession of a controlled substance and the attempted 
distribution of a controlled substance. The Appellant, in prison, was unaware of 
these proceedings for some time. Nevertheless, as soon as the Appellant had 
knowledge of the activities of his former counsel, he realized those activities likely 
seriously impaired his right to effective counsel and thus impacted Appellant's guilty 
plea. 
The Appellant was never told by his trial counsel, nor by his other attorney, 
Christopher Greenwood, of the defense of self-defense to attempted murder or 
assault, nor was this available defense explored. The Appellant did not discover this 
defense nor its applicability to this case until speaking with his current attorney. 
Nevertheless, as soon as Appellant realized that he was prejudiced by not having 
effective counsel at the time of his plea, he judiciously sought counsel and sought 
post-convection relief. 
A court may excuse an Appellant's untimely filing if it finds that the interests 
of justice require it. In evaluating whether or not the interests of justice grant an 
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excuse to untimely filing, a district court should analyze both the merits for the claim 
for relief and the reasons for the untimely filing. Johnson v. State, 2006 UT 21, ]fs 
18,20. 
In the instant case, as stated, the Appellant was charged with attempted 
murder and subsequently entered a plea of guilty to aggravated assault. U.C.A. 
§78-2-402, identifies self-defense as a justification for "threatening or using force 
against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force 
is necessary to defend himself." The Appellant's former wife had a history of 
domestic violence. However, Appellant's trial counsel never apprised the Appellant 
of the possibility of asserting the defense of self-defense to the attempted murder 
charge. Had Appellant been apprised of such a possibility, it could ultimately have 
changed the outcome of the case. Appellant only became aware of this possibility 
upon consulting with his current counsel, which was well after the time for filing relief 
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (now codified at U.C.A. §§78B-9-101 et 
seq.) had expired. 
The failure of Appellant's trial counsel to inform Appellant of the availability of 
this defense to his charges independently, combined with prior counsel's other 
actions, such as advising his client while under the influence of controlled 
substances as evidenced by being convicted of possession and use of controlled 
substances, clearly constitute ineffective assistance of counsel as described by 
Adams, supra. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The Appellant joins with the State in requesting oral argument. As the 
Appellee indicated citing Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(3), the decisional 
process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
DATED this day of December, 2008. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, PC 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
ERIN RILEY 
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
P.O. BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 
On this day of December, 2008. 
Secretary 
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